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Abstract: Many scholars agree that the Internet plays a pivotal role in self-radicalization, 
which can lead to behaviours ranging from lone-wolf terrorism to participation in white 
nationalist rallies to mundane bigotry and voting for extremist candidates. However, the 
mechanisms by which the Internet facilitates self-radicalization are disputed; some fault 
the individuals who end up self-radicalized, while others lay the blame on the 
technology itself. In this paper, we explore the role played by technological design 
decisions in online self-radicalization in its myriad guises, encompassing extreme as 
well as more mundane forms. We begin by characterizing the phenomenon of 
technological seduction. Next, we distinguish between top-down seduction and bottom-
up seduction. We then situate both forms of technological seduction within the 
theoretical model of dynamical systems theory. We conclude by articulating strategies 
for combatting online self-radicalization.  
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1. Self-Radicalization  
 
The 2015 Charleston church mass shooting, which left 9 dead, was planned and 
executed by white supremacist Dylann Roof. According to prosecutors, Roof did not 
adopt his convictions ‘through his personal associations or experiences with white 
supremacist groups or individuals or others.’1 Instead, they developed through his own 
efforts and engagement online.  
 
The same is true of Jose Pimentel, who in 2011 began reading online Al Qaeda websites, 
after which he built homemade pipe bombs in an effort to target veterans returning from 
Iraq and Afghanistan.2 Also self-radicalized online were Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev, perpetrators of the 2013 Boston Marathon massacre.3 In 2016, Omar Mateen 
killed forty-nine people in a Florida night club. Like Pimentel, Roof, and the Tsarnaev 
brothers, Mateen was radicalized through his activities online.4 More recently, Alex 
Minassian, sole perpetrator of the 2018 ‘incel’-related mass attack in Toronto, was found 
to be self-radicalized online, with his ‘worldview… heavily influenced by the grievance 
culture that defines [online] message boards like r/Incel and certain sections of 4chan’.5 
 
These are just a few examples of a phenomenon called lone-wolf terrorism (Weimann 
2012). Many scholars agree that this form of terrorism is facilitated by the Internet 
(Precht 2007; von Behr et al. 2013, §3). However, the specific mechanisms by which the 
Internet facilitates self-radicalization — in the extreme case of lone-wolf terrorism as 
well as in more mundane cases such as extremist attitudes and voting behaviour — are 
disputed. According to Bjelopera (2010), it does so by normalizing the kind of 
behaviours and attitudes the discussion of which would typically be viewed as 
unacceptable and met with disapprobation offline.6 On another view (Silber et al. 2007), 
the Internet facilitates self-radicalization by generating an echo-chamber (AKA “filter 
bubble”): people interested in radical ideology tend to communicate directly or 
indirectly only with each other, reinforcing their predilections. A related opinion is that 
the phenomenon of group polarization, as facilitated by social media chat forums, is 
among the salient causes (Sunstein 2011; 2017). 
 
Other researchers question the underlying assumption that the Internet is the sort of 
thing we should blame. Omotoyinbo (2014, p. 58), for example, argues that in these cases 
the “Netizen [user of the Internet] is the criminal and that the Net is a guiltless 
accomplice.” Those inclined to turn an eye away from the medium itself have sought 
various alternative explanations for the phenomenon of self-radicalization, such as social 
                                               
1 Berman (2016). 
2 Weimann (2012). 
3 Majeed (2016, Ch. 11). 
4 Pilkington and Roberts (2016). 
5 See Feldman (2018). 
6 See also von Behr et al. (2013). 
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alienation (Abrahams 2002; Torok 2011).  
 
Surrounding the dark shadow of lone-wolf terrorism is the broader penumbra of self-
radicalization that results in less dramatic but still worrisome actions and attitudes. The 
‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017 brought together neo-Nazis, 
white supremacists, and white nationalistic sympathizers for one of the largest in-person 
hate-themed meetings in the United States in decades. Many of the participants in this 
rally were organized and recruited via the Internet.7 Even more broadly, white 
supremacists and their sympathizers met and organized on r/The_Donald (a Reddit 
community) and elsewhere during the 2016 American presidential campaign that 
resulted in the election of Donald Trump.8 The radicalization of Trump voters may be 
less extreme, but it demands an explanation just as much as the radicalization of Dylann 
Roof. 
 
Omotoyinbo’s analysis of online self-radicalization, according to which blame should 
not go to the technology, runs counter to the view of Langdon Winner (1986, pp. 19-39) 
that artifacts and socio-technical systems can “have politics.”9 Winner identifies two 
main ways in which values, principles, and power-relations can be embedded in such 
systems. First, the adoption of a technology could necessitate certain kinds of human 
relations while making others impossible. The socio-technical system thus becomes a 
way of settling a political question with relatively permanent infrastructure. Second, a 
socio-technical system could be strongly consilient with one set of political relationships 
and strongly in tension with another. In either case, there is a feedback loop between the 
political arrangements that lead to the adoption of the socio-technical system in the first 
place and those facilitated by the system once it is in place. We worry that the 
contemporary Internet reliably fosters political attitudes and associations that other 
socio-technical systems for information-transfer and communication would not.  
 
This is not to suggest that there is any one cause of Internet-facilitated self-radicalization, 
or that there must be any particular primary cause for all cases. However, we do think 
that one overlooked influence in some prominent cases is the way information-gathering 
and -delivery work on the contemporary Internet. 
 
In what follows, we explore how various kinds of technological design decisions can 
and do play a role in online self-radicalization. If our argument is on the right track, then 
combatting online radicalization must involve not merely investigating and 
implementing existing strategies such as depolarisation (Vinokur and Burnstein 1978), 
                                               
7 As reported by the Anti-Defamation League, such online recruitment efforts had already begun 
increasingly transitioning to real-world meetups during the months leading up to Charlottesville. 
https://www.adl.org/blog/alt-right-moving-from-online-to-real-world-activity  
8 https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/dissecting-trumps-most-rabid-online-following 
9 See §2.2 for examples involving web design.  
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community policing (Ndili 2016), and public education (Neumann 2013). It requires in 
addition that we allocate resources (philosophical, engineering, political) to 
technological design decision-making.  
 
Here is the plan for this paper: §2 introduces two varieties of what we call technological 
seduction : top-down seduction (§2.1) and bottom-up seduction (§2.2). §3 situates both 
varieties within the theoretical model of dynamical systems theory by showing how top-
down and bottom-up seduction generate two kinds of feedback loops that pull 
technology users toward extremes. §4 concludes by articulating strategies for 
combatting online radicalization in light of the conclusions drawn in §§2-3.  
2. Varieties of Technological Seduction 
 
In this section, we characterize seduction as a multi-stage process. According to 
Forrester (1990, p. 42), “the first step in a seductive maneuver could be summed up as, ‘I 
know what you’re thinking.’” This gambit expresses several underlying attitudes. First, 
it evinces “the assumption of authority that seduction requires.” The authority in 
question is epistemic rather than the authority of force. Seduction is distinguished from 
assault in that it aims at, requires, even fetishizes consent. However, as Conly (2004) 
argues, seduction can be said, at least in some cases, to “interfere with the reasoning 
process,” sometimes “subverting” it.10 The seducer insists that he is better-placed to 
know what the seducee thinks than the seducee himself is. Second, ‘I know what you’re 
thinking’ presupposes or establishes an intimate bond. Nothing is more bound up with 
personal identity than someone’s inner life — their thoughts, feelings, emotions, and 
values (Strohminger & Nichols 2014). The seducer’s insistence that he knows what the 
seducee is thinking thus brings the two into close connection. Third, ‘I know what 
you’re thinking’ blurs the line between assertion, imperative, and declaration. This is 
because human agency and cognition are often scaffolded on dialogical processes. We 
find out what we think by expressing it and hearing it echoed back in a way we can 
accept; we also find out what we think by having thoughts attributed to us and agreeing 
with those attributions (Alfano 2013; 2018; Doris 2015; Wong 2006).  
 
The next step in a typical seduction, as we here conceive it, is an affirmative response by 
the seducee: “Yes, you do know what I’m thinking.” The third step moves from the 
realm of language to the realm of action. The seducer now suggests, “So let’s do….” And 
in the fourth and final step in a (successful) seduction the seducee agrees. Seduction is 
often (though not necessarily) modally robust (Pettit 2015). After someone has been 
seduced, in a wide range of counterfactual scenarios they will typically both continue to 
accept that the seducer knows what they are thinking and continue to be committed to 
                                               
10 Like Forrester, Conly (2004) does not explicitly define seduction; she only characterises it in relation to 
human reasoning. 
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acting in concert with the seducer. 
 
In this section, we diagnose two ways in which information technologies play the 
functional role of the seducer by telling Netizens, “I know what you’re thinking.” We 
label these top-down and bottom-up technological seduction for reasons that emerge 
below. 
2.1 Top-down seduction  
 
Top-down technological seduction is imposed by technological designers, who, in 
structuring technological architecture in particular ways (e.g., designing websites with 
certain kinds of menus and options), invite users to accept that their own thinking is 
similarly structured.11 In so doing, designers encourage or ‘nudge’ the user towards 
certain prescribed choices and attitudes (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). In this section, we’ll 
outline this phenomenon, and in §3, we’ll consider how nudged choices can (sometimes 
in tandem with bottom-up seduction) guide individuals in malignant directions.  
 
First, though, some preliminaries. Nudging is a familiar phenomenon and one that 
needn’t be viewed as inherently problematic. As Thaler et al. (2014) point out, people 
“do not make choices in a vacuum. They make them in an environment where many 
features, noticed and unnoticed, can influence their decisions” (2014, p. 1).  
 
Consider the presentation of our choices in supermarkets and when selecting television 
stations (White 2013). Supermarkets must present goods in some way or another, with 
certain items closer to the front and to checkout stands; likewise, television stations must 
be assigned some distinct number, which will inevitably be less than or greater than 
other numbers and thus will involve more or less clicking effort relative to the default 
(low number) presentation. Sunstein (2014) calls this the inevitability of choice 
architecture. Choices (e.g., what to buy at the supermarket, which station to watch) will 
unavoidably be structured in some particular way; choices are not presented without a 
frame even by those who value the chooser’s autonomy. 
 
When the inevitability of choice architecture is paired with collateral information about 
human choice behaviour (including systematic cognitive biases), decision-makers will, 
even when free to make their own choices, nonetheless be steered toward particular 
choices in a way that reflects the manner in which the initial space of choices is 
presented. Nudging can be intentional or non-intentional. If, for instance, the store 
shelves at the supermarket are stocked randomly, individuals are more likely to 
purchase things closer to the front, whatever these things happen to be. Individuals can 
accordingly be nudged unintentionally (one might also say, negligently or recklessly) 
                                               
11 The contrast between the systems designer/engineer’s and user’s perspectives is a recurring issue in 
human-computer interaction Rogers et al (2012).  
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through thoughtless design of choice architecture.  
 
But nudging can be and often is intentional, as when choice architecture is structured to 
steer in ways that align with the designer’s goals. According to proponents of libertarian 
paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein 2003a; 2003b; Sunstein 2014, p. 430), policymakers not 
only can but should design choice architecture in a way that both makes it transparent to 
public scrutiny and nudges citizens towards positive decisions. In the supermarket 
example, this might involve laws that require supermarkets to place soda and cigarettes 
toward the back of the store and away from checkout stands12 or that require employers 
to present a prudent retirement plan for employees as a default.13 
 
Not all intentional nudges are benevolent. A nudge could be calculated to benefit the 
nudger (e.g., certain kinds of marketing) or a third party (e.g., nudging people to donate 
to a charity). The New York Times presently gives subscribers a free choice to cancel their 
subscription, but exercising that option requires calling during business hours. While 
the choice to cancel in this case is a free one, the Times is capitalizing on information 
about human psychology to add friction that steers individuals toward continuing with 
the subscription, a goal that aligns with the choice architects’ goals.  
 
Creating friction is just one way to nudge people, and it needn’t rely on technological 
design in any serious way. But technological design offers additional ways to nudge. 
When gathering information online, for example, one encounters what is in effect a 
choice architecture chain, which involves moving through a series of drop-down menus, 
app search tools, algorithm-generated key terms, friend suggestions, related stories, and 
other content. These processes feed back into one another, making someone’s journey 
through the choice architecture increasingly path-dependent over time.  
 
The design decisions that drive the various links in such a chain can be malignant if 
(among other things) they construct the relevant categories and subcategories so as to 
make it seem that some phenomena that deserve attention aren’t worthy of attention or 
that some phenomena that don’t deserve attention do deserve attention.14 Consider, for 
example, drop-down menu design.15 On the main page of the US political website The 
Daily Caller, you will find a category called ‘The Issues’. There are myriad ‘issues’ that 
might be of general concern or interest. Which specific ones do you (the user) want to 
know about? How do you decide?  
 
The Daily Caller makes this very simple. Hover your mouse over ‘The Issues’ and three 
                                               
12 See Alemanno (2012).  
13 See Thaler and Benartzi (2004) and Dayan and Bar-Hillel (2011).  
14 See Alfano & Skorburg (2018) for an example. 
15 See Carter (2017). 
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choices pop up: <DEFENSE>, <EDUCATION>, and <ENERGY>.16 This design choice 
gives the illusion of carving news reality at its joints and engages what Kahneman (2011) 
calls the what-you-see-is-all-there-is (WYSIATI) mindset, an outlook that often leads 
people to uncritically accept one of the framed options as legitimate, and to carry on 
searching (encountering further menus) having already made a choice within that 
framed space. 
 
What is non-explicitly communicated by The Daily Caller’s design choice is that defense, 
education, and energy are all and only the issues the user will or should care about. 
Supposing the reader clicked on the first option, <DEFENSE>, and then clicked on the 
first story of the four juxtaposed by images, the reader will within seconds of thinking 
about something as general as ‘Issues’ find herself reading a story about how a US Army 
Howitzer has ‘covfefe’ stamped on the gun of its M109 Paladin.17 
 
The design of application interfaces can likewise engage the WYSIATI mindset by 
inducing users to perceive not only choice options but also experiences and values in 
misleading ways. As Google Design ethicist Tristan Harris (2014) notes: 
 
When we wake up in the morning and turn our phone over to see a list of 
notifications — it frames the experience of “waking up in the morning” around a 
menu of “all the things I’ve missed since yesterday.” [...] How empowering is 
this menu of choices when we wake up? Does it reflect what we care about? 
 
Harris’s case involves a smartphone feature that uses an algorithm to frame a narrative 
each morning around what the algorithm takes to be the key things one has missed 
during sleep. The kinds of notifications that frame such a narrative include information 
such as: who accepted an Instagram follower request, spam from a music app, a spam 
suggestion from an app called any.DO to ‘take a moment to plan your day’, information 
that someone liked an Instagram photo, and so on. Even in cases where there is a 
substantial disparity between the user’s values and interests and the algorithm’s 
imputation of these values and interests, a user may be inclined to tacitly accept the 
algorithm’s narrative by selecting from its highlights.  
 
Technological seduction in these two kinds of cases needn’t be a matter of saying or 
implying, “I know that you’re thinking that p.” The kind of seduction that features in 
these cases is structural. In the drop-down menu case, the seduction at issue involves 
suggestions like:  
 
                                               
16 Search conducted 5 August 2017 in the United Kingdom. 
17 URL = <http://dailycaller.com/2017/06/23/army-tank-has-covfefe-stamped-on-the-gun-photo/ >. 
Accessed 18 August 2017. 
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● “I know that you think these are the most important categories when it comes to 
news.” (e.g., main categories on menu)18  
● “I know that you think X is associated with Y.” (e.g., above-chance association of 
tags or labels)19 
● “I know that you treat X as a subcategory of Y.” (e.g., sub-menus).  
 
When the Netizen is confronted with these first steps in the seductive process, they may 
very well continue to the second, third, and fourth steps. In other words, they may — 
explicitly or implicitly — think, “Yes, that is what I think.” This makes them susceptible 
to a suggestion to act in the third step. It seems highly likely that this process played a 
role in the 2016 US presidential election, at least for some voters. The media with which 
they engaged impressed categorical associations on them, then used those associations 
to bolster exhortations to vote for one candidate over another (or not to vote at all).20  
 
Compare what we are calling top-down seduction to Kant’s deduction of the Categories 
in the Critique of Pure Reason (A84-85=B116-117). The analogy is, of course, only partial, 
but we think that a brief acknowledgment of the commonalities is instructive. Note that 
in much the same way that, for Kant, quantity, quality, relation, and modality are the 
given categories that structure cognition of objects in the empirical world, for readers of 
The Daily Caller, the given categories that structure cognition of the news are Politics, US, 
World, Entertainment, Sports, Business, Outdoors, and The Issues (subdivided into defense, 
education, and energy). In both cases, the categories are, in a straightforward sense, 
already provided, and in a way that circumscribes what moves are available to the 
thinker. To use another news site as an example, Netizens who get their news from 
Breitbart face a world structured by the categories of Big Government, Big Journalism, Big 
Hollywood, National Security, Tech, and Sports. Netizens who get their news from The 
Guardian, by contrast, encounter a world structured by the categories of World, Politics, 
Sport, Football, Culture, Lifestyle, Environment, Economy, Media, Tech, and Travel. Naturally, 
there are differences between the Kantian picture of the mind and the technological 
categorizations we are exploring. According to Kant, there is no way to get outside the 
Categories. A Netizen can change their media diet. But if our arguments above about the 
stickiness of defaults and the WYSIATI mindset are on the right track, Netizens are 
liable to get stuck in the categories imposed by technological design.  
 
                                               
18 Instances of seduction taking this shape feature in consumption of ‘personalised’ news, as reported in 
literature on filter bubbles (Pariser 2011; Flaxman et al. (2016). For reports on the prevalence of such 
personalisation, see Van Hoboken (2012) and Dillahunt, Brooks, & Gulati (2015).  
19 See Benker et al. (2017) for evidence of this form of seduction during the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
campaign.  
20 See, for example, URL = <http://www.breitbart.com/2016-presidential-race/2016/11/05/hillary-clinton-
jail-not-white-house/>, which uses Breitbart’s frequent association of Hilary Clinton with criminality to 
make a case against electing her. 
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When Netizens are invited to accept that their own thinking is structured in socially 
dangerous or hateful ways, choice architects can seduce users to embrace prejudiced 
attitudes. In other words, they end up following the second step in the formula for 
seduction articulated above. Just compare the Daily Caller drop-down menu of ‘Issues’ 
(one which seduces merely to simple-minded thinking) with the kind of semantic tags 
Breitbart associates with its content. One of the more objectionable tags at Breitbart is 
‘Black Crime’.21 (There is no corresponding tag for ‘White Crime’ or any other racialized 
crime.) As of October 2017, there were six Breitbart stories with this tag, all with 
sensationalistic headlines, such as, “Black rape gangs violate two Detroit women in one 
night, hours apart,” and “Black mob swarms Georgia Walmart to see ‘how much 
damage’ they could do.”   
 
If we compare the semantic tags on all stories published in 2016 by Breitbart with the 
tags used by other news organizations, it becomes clear that the world will look very 
different to a regular Breitbart reader than it does to, for example, a regular NPR or 
Huffington Post reader (Figures 1-3).22  
 
Figure 1. Network of the top 200 semantic tags on Breitbart in 2016. Layout = 
ForceAtlas. Node size = PageRank. Node color = semantic community membership. 
Edge width = frequency of co-occurrence.  
 
                                               
21 URL = <http://www.breitbart.com/tag/black-crime/>, accessed 11 October 2017. 
22 This digital humanities methodology was pioneered in the context of philosophy by Alfano et al. (2018). 
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Figure 2. Network of the top 100 semantic tags on NPR’s “The Two Way” news 
section in 2016. Layout = ForceAtlas. Node size = PageRank. Node color = semantic 
community membership. Edge width = frequency of co-occurrence. Only 100 semantic 
tags were chosen for NPR due to its overall sample size which is one order of magnitude 
less than Huffington Post and Breitbart. 
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Figure 3. Network of the top 200 semantic tags on the Huffington Post in 2016. Layout 
= ForceAtlas. Node size = PageRank. Node color = semantic community membership. 
Edge width = frequency of co-occurrence.  
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Figures 1-3 show that the media world in which readers of Breitbart live looks very 
different from the media world in which readers of either NPR (a centrist media 
organization) or the Huffington Post (a liberal voice) live. Breitbart consumers see a world 
in which the most important news is that Mexican cartels commit atrocities in Texas, 
Muslim terrorist immigrants rampage through Europe, Barack Obama seeks to take 
citizens’ guns, Russia and Turkey intervene in Syria to help fight the Islamic State, and 
Milo Yiannopoulos takes on feminist social media censorship via his self-styled 
“Dangerous Faggot Tour.” Readers of other sites encounter some of the same 
phenomena (framed in less threatening ways), as well as a host of other phenomena that 
fit less easily into Breitbart’s Manichean worldview, such as right-wing attacks against 
the LGBT community, the sentencing of Dylann Roof, law enforcement agencies’ 
showdown with technology companies over consumer privacy, and NASA’s exploration 
13 
 
of the solar system. 
 
This phenomenon is well-characterized by ‘agenda-setting’ theory, which suggests that 
consumers of news “learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of the 
emphasis placed on it in the news” (McCombs 2000). In essence, the ‘public agenda’ for 
Breitbart readers can be said to be shaped by the emphasis and coverage given by 
Breitbart to certain topics and tags. We also note that modern news websites, including 
those we analysed above, have facilities for commenting and sharing via social media 
outlets; arguably social media could serve to augment the ‘agenda-setting’ power of 
such news websites. 
 
Moreover, as Figures 1-3 indicate, the consumer of (for instance) Breitbart will have her 
experiences structured in a way that may naturally give rise to distinctive biases. 
Plausibly, a reader of Breitbart Texas, for example, will be led to associate Mexican 
concepts with crime concepts and negative valence. Such conceptual connections (e.g., 
Mexico=crime=bad), when ossified, are epistemically problematic because they lead 
people to make unjustified generalisations and act upon them.23  
 
We will discuss the effects of top-down seduction in connection with self-radicalization 
in more detail in §3. First, though, we turn to a related but distinct form of technological 
seduction.  
2.2 Bottom-up seduction 
 
Whereas top-down technological seduction plays out through the agency of designers 
(whether they know it or not), bottom-up seduction can occur without the involvement 
of anyone’s agency other than the seducee. Top-down technological seduction imposes a 
taxonomic structure of categories, sub-categories, and associations on users, inviting 
them to accept that this is how their own concepts, sub-concepts, and mental 
associations are structured. It is to some extent Procrustean: the same top-down 
structure is suggested to and imposed on all users. 
 
Bottom-up technological seduction is different: it creates suggestions either by 
aggregating other users’ data or by personalizing for each user based on their location, 
search history, or other data. It takes a user’s own record of engagement as the basis for 
saying, “I know what you’re thinking.”24 Engagement, in this context, refers to all 
recorded aspects of a user’s individual online behavior. This includes their browsing 
history (which sites/links they visit, frequency of such visits, etc.), their search history, 
                                               
23 See Holroyd & Sweetman (2015). 
24 Although our descriptions of bottom-up seduction use agency-language in places, we remain neutral with 
respect to artificial agency. For a notable defence of artificial agency and the morality of artificial agents, 
see Floridi and Sanders (2014). 
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their record of sharing and “liking” posts on social media, their email record (if, for 
example, they use Google for both search and email), their physical location and 
trajectory (if, for example, they use Google’s location services for navigation, or merely 
having the ‘location history’25 feature active), and so on. While it is possible to disguise 
these aspects of one’s online signature in various ways, most users neglect to do so. In 
addition to the individual’s own record of engagement, others’ records of engagement 
can be used to profile that individual. To the extent that your record of engagement — 
even in depersonalized aggregated form — is more similar to that of one set of users 
than that of another set of users, you’re liable to be profiled among the former. Bottom-
up seduction can say, “I know what you’re thinking” because it can justifiably say, “I 
know what you and people like you thought, and what those other people went on to 
think.” 
 
Bottom-up technological seduction occurs when profiling enables both predictive and 
prescriptive analytics to tell a Netizen, “I know what you’re thinking,” and prompt the 
sort of uptake that leads to action. This is especially worrisome when the process 
bypasses the user’s capacity for reasoning. Following Koralus & Mascarenhas (2013) on 
reasoning in general and Koralus & Alfano (2017) on moral reasoning in particular, we 
understand reasoning as the iterative, path-dependent process of asking and answering 
questions. Profiling enables online interfaces such as Google to tailor both search 
suggestions (using predictive analytics) and answers to search queries (using 
prescriptive analytics) to an individual user.  
 
Consider a simple example: predictive analytics will suggest, based on a user’s profile 
and the initial text string they enter, which query they might want to run. For instance, if 
you type ‘why are women’ into Google’s search bar, you are likely to see suggested 
queries such as ‘why are women colder than men’, ‘why are women protesting’, and 
‘why are women so mean’.26 And if you type ‘why are men’ into Google’s search bar, 
you are likely to see suggested queries such as ‘why are men jerks’, ‘why are men taller 
than women’, and ‘why are men attracted to breasts’.27 These are cases of predictive 
analytics. The same predictive searches conducted in another geographic location, at 
another time, by an account with a different history and social graph will yield different 
results.28 
 
                                               
25 URL = <https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3118687?hl=en>. Site accessed 17 October 2017 
from Australia. 
26 Search conducted 10 June 2017 in the Netherlands. 
27 Search conducted 10 June 2017 in the Netherlands.  
28 Depending on a user’s profile, the content of search results can be subject to change, as in the case of 
Google’s Personalised Search, which can “customize search results for you based upon 180 days of search 
activity linked to an anonymous cookie in your browser”. See 
<https://googleblog.blogspot.com.au/2009/12/personalized-search-for-everyone.html>.  
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Prescriptive analytics in turn suggests answers based on both the query someone runs 
and their profile. In its most naïve form, a search for the query ‘cafe’ returns results for 
cafés nearest to the user; the top results will differ for someone in Amsterdam as 
opposed to Abuja. To continue with our prior examples: in response to ‘why are women 
colder than men’, one of Google’s top suggestions is a post titled “Why are Women 
Always Cold and Men Always Hot,” which claims that differences between the sexes in 
the phenomenology of temperature are due to the fact that men have scrotums.29 In 
response to ‘why are men jerks’, one of Google’s top suggestions is a post titled “The 
Truth Behind Why Men are Assholes,” which contends that men need to act like 
assholes to establish their dominance and ensure a balance of power between the sexes.30 
And in response to ‘why are women so mean’, Google suggests posts answering 
questions about why beautiful women in particular are so mean, why women are so 
mean to each other, and why women are so mean to men. Most of these posts have a 
strongly misogynistic flavor, suggesting that beautiful women are mean because they 
are sick of being approached by weak men, that women are mean to each other to 
establish dominance hierarchies in pursuit of male attention, and that women are mean 
to men in general because feminism has corrupted their natural impulses. These 
misogynistic themes have recently been given an academic gloss by Jordan Peterson 
(2018), but he first articulated them in a post on Quora,31 from which they quickly spread 
to Reddit and went viral.32 
 
In a case of bottom-up technological seduction, Google suggests questions and then 
answers to those very questions, thereby closing the loop on the first stage of an 
iterative, path-dependent process of reasoning. If reasoning is the process of asking and 
answering questions, then the interaction between predictive and prescriptive analytics 
can largely bypass the individual’s contribution to reasoning, supplying both a question 
and its answer. When such predictive and prescriptive analytics are based in part on the 
user’s profile, Google is in effect saying, “I know what you’re thinking because I know 
what you and those like you thought.” 
 
Consider next the path-dependency mentioned above. Which question you ask depends 
in part on both the questions you asked previously and the answers you accepted to 
those questions. If both the initial question and its answer are shaped by predictive and 
prescriptive analytics, then the first question-answer pair in the process of reasoning 
largely bypasses the human’s contribution. But that in turn means that subsequent 
                                               
29 URL = <https://www.qualityhealth.com/womens-health-articles/why-women-always-cold-men-always-
hot>. Site accessed 10 June 2017 from the Netherlands. 
30 URL = <http://elitedaily.com/dating/sex/men-assholes/>. Site accessed 10 June 2017 from the 
Netherlands. 
31 URL = https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-most-valuable-things-everyone-should-know. 
32 URL = 
<https://www.reddit.com/r/JordanPeterson/comments/75akn0/dr_jordan_petersons_42_rules_for_life_the_
origins/> 
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questions and answers depend on this bypassing, potentially sending the user deeper 
into an epistemic and ethical morass. 
 
To illustrate, suppose you were interested in anything beginning with the text string 
‘alt’, such as ‘alternative energy’. You type these first three letters into Google’s search 
bar, and it suggests ‘alt right’. Though you weren’t initially interested in this query, the 
suggestion piques your curiosity. You run the ‘alt right’ query, and several of the top 
results are videos on YouTube (a subsidiary of Google’s parent company, Alphabet). 
The top result is a video by The Atlantic titled, “Rebranding White Nationalism: Richard 
Spencer’s Alt-Right.”33 After watching this eleven-minute video, you allow the top 
suggested video (as determined by the video you clicked on and your own profile) to 
auto-play. It’s a clip titled “White nationalist Richard Spencer talks to Al Jazeera.”34 
When the video ends, you allow the next top suggested video to auto-play: “BEST OF 
Richard Spencer vs Hostile Audience at Texas A&M.”35 This is a post by the white 
supremacist account Demography is Destiny. It celebrates Spencer’s political positions 
and those like them. The first three letters of an innocent online search have been 
hijacked: in just a few steps, you went from the start of a query about alternative energy 
to Demography is Destiny.36 The hypothetical Netizen who follows this path may set off 
on the four-step process of seduction articulated above. First, YouTube tells them, “I 
know what you’re thinking.” Next, they accept that attribution. Third, they encounter 
propaganda that directs them to take action. Finally, they do so. This seems to have been 
precisely the steps followed by at least some of the participants in the “Unite the Right” 
riot and white supremacist rally.37 
 
YouTube is especially adept at this kind of bottom-up seduction because it uses 
unsupervised learning on Google’s powerful artificial intelligence system to find 
patterns in individuals’ and groups’ preferences, then recommend clips that they’re 
most likely to engage with (Newton 2017): 
 
“We knew people were coming to YouTube when they knew what they 
were coming to look for,” says Jim McFadden, the technical lead for 
YouTube recommendations, who joined the company in 2011. “We also 
wanted to serve the needs of people when they didn’t necessarily know 
what they wanted to look for.”’ 
 
McFadden’s team succeeded. The vast majority of the time people spend watching 
                                               
33 Search conducted 10 June 2017 in the Netherlands. URL = 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVeZ0_Lhazw>.  
34 URL = <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVeZ0_Lhazw>.  
35 URL = <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FxfDOOY2H28>.  
36 See also Tufekci (2018) for a recent discussion of this phenomenon. 
37 URL = <https://medium.com/@MediaManipulation/unite-the-right-how-youtubes-recommendation-
algorithm-connects-the-u-s-far-right-9f1387ccfabd>. 
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videos on YouTube is now driven by algorithmic recommendations rather than search 
or linking. Whistleblower Guillaume Chaslot, who was fired by YouTube in 2013 for 
raising this criticism, has shown that YouTube recommendations are systematically 
biased in favour of bizarre, violent, and extremist content (Lewis 2018). 
 
This is what we mean by the path-dependency of bottom-up technological seduction: 
one’s initial question may be shaped by predictive analytics, the answer to it determined 
by prescriptive analytics, and the character of one’s subsequent questions and the 
answers to them shaped by the first round of question-and-answer. While the process 
may not bypass human cognition entirely, it can bypass critical reasoning in troubling 
ways. Feedback loops between predictive and prescriptive analytics are liable to make 
the human user a largely passive consumer and observer rather than an inquisitive and 
critical questioner. 
3. Technological Seduction: A Theoretical Model  
 
In this section, we first outline the concept of attractors as they feature in dynamical 
systems theory, then use this notion to illuminate how (in the course of the kinds of top-
down and bottom-up technological seduction articulated in §§2.1-2.2) it can be difficult 
to avoid being pulled into the direction of hate or extremism online. This will be 
especially so for those who have established certain kinds of engagement histories. For 
such individuals, steering away from hate or extremism while navigating the Internet is 
like trying to thread a needle. 
  
Dynamical systems theory (DST) is a mathematical framework for studying the 
behaviour of systems whose endogenous states influence systemic parameters over 
time.38 Dynamic systems themselves are characterized in DST by a set of state variables, 
x, and a dynamical law, L — which is usually a set of differential equations that take 
states and parameters as arguments — where L regulates the change of those state 
variables over time. 
  
Sometimes no matter what the initial state of the system is, the system will end up 
gravitating to some set of points — called a limit set — over time. Attractors are defined 
as limit sets that gravitate trajectories (i.e., sequences of states that arise from some initial 
state x0 and the law, L) that are passing through all the nearby states. Each attractor is 
surrounded by what is called its ‘basin of attraction’. (Consider, for example, the 
gravitational field surrounding a star. Nearby objects, once in contact with the 
gravitational field, are then pulled in towards the star.) By contrast, repellers are defined 
as limit sets that push away trajectories that are passing through nearby states. 
Understanding the limit sets (attractors and repellers) of a system is crucial to 
                                               
38 See Palermos (2016) for helpful discussion. Cf., Abraham, Abraham, & Shaw (1990) and Beer (1995). 
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understanding the regularities of the system’s behaviour. In the case of both attractors 
and repellers, feedback loops play a crucial role. An object on a trajectory through an 
attractor’s basin of attraction will receive a little push towards the attractor, which will 
place it more firmly within the basin of attraction for another, bigger push at the next 
stage, which will place it even more firmly within the basin of attraction at the stage 
after that. Likewise for repellers: an object on a trajectory through a repeller’s basin of 
repulsion will receive a little push away from the repeller, which will place it further 
from the repeller at the next stage, and so on. 
  
Attractors as such are evaluatively neutral. Some tend towards beneficial consequences. 
In the case of transactive memory systems featuring individuals in close relationships 
(e.g., as when two individuals together recall something neither would have recalled 
individually),39 the process of reciprocal interaction through mutual memory sharing 
draws such individuals towards memories that neither would easily (or at all) produce 
individually.40  
  
However, while the kinds of feedback loops that make transactive memory systems 
work are helpful, the feedback loops we’ve already seen in the case of technological 
seduction are pernicious. With reference to DST, we may appreciate how, when 
someone seeks news online, the two forms of technological seduction we’ve articulated 
function as distinct kinds of attractors that can make it difficult to avoid hateful attitudes 
and content. And as with the analogy of gravitational fields — once the searcher is 
pulled toward the attractor, it is all the more difficult not to get sucked in.   
  
Take, for instance, the Kantian analogy discussed in the example of Breitbart’s design 
decisions in §2.1. While searching from within the initial choice space Breitbart offers, 
certain concepts will be available to the user and others not; certain associations will be 
salient and others not; certain concepts will appear as species of superordinate concepts. 
As one continues to navigate within this frame, one’s trust and distrust will be directed 
and shaped so that one tends to further confirm (for oneself) the Breitbart worldview. If 
one falls into its orbit, one is liable to get stuck. 
 
This latter point — that one is liable to get ‘stuck’ in the circumstances described — 
comports with the way philosophers of education41 theorise about a notorious challenge 
to the efficacy of exemplars and other role models.42 As Tanesini (2016) notes, the 
effectiveness of a message does not exclusively depend on the strength of the arguments 
contained, but also on audience receptiveness:  
 
                                               
39 See Wegner (1987; 1991). 
40 See also Hollingshead (1998). 
41 See Porter (2016).  
42 See Zagzebski (2017). 
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[those] who are the furthest away from intellectual virtue are precisely those who 
are less likely to pay attention. Exposure to exemplars might work only if it 
stimulates emulation. It is counterproductive if it leads to demoralisation or if it 
fans an already inflated conception of the self. (2016, p. 524)  
     
Though Tanesini’s point concerns entrenched attitudes in education, it generalises to our 
case of top-down attractors. Once an individual’s concepts and thinking have been 
initially furnished, shaped, and (through repeated confirmation and reinforcement) 
ossified through interaction with choice architecture like Breitbart’s, he is liable to 
become less receptive to the very kinds of influences that would otherwise push him 
away from the attractor. To the extent that one’s cognitive and conceptual capacity for 
certain kinds of experiences is already formed through one’s interaction history and 
subsequent cognitive and conceptual alignment with the relevant choice architecture, 
one is vulnerable to capture by the attractor. In this sense, one becomes genuinely stuck 
— intellectually rigid and immovable through typical discursive and rhetorical 
mechanisms.43  
  
One might try to avoid falling into this basin of attraction in one of three ways: first, one 
could ignore online news entirely. While this strategy would prevent one from being 
sucked in by a hateful attractor, it has the obvious downside of leaving one uninformed. 
Second, one could make an explicit attempt to curate the sources of one’s online news by 
avoiding problematic sources entirely (Levy 2017) and seek information from multiple 
reliable sources. However, if these multiple sources are not independent, then they will 
only serve to amplify the attractive power of the worldview they endorse. And 
establishing the independence of one’s sources is no easy matter. Third, one could 
eschew curated news media and instead attempt to get directly to stories that are 
reported by accurate, reliable, and responsible sources. This could be done using, rather 
than a news website, a search engine such as Google.44 While this third strategy might 
sidestep Breitbart-style choice architecture, one isn’t yet in the clear. By searching for 
news on Google, in an attempt to receive the news in a more autonomous fashion, one 
risks getting stuck in an uncurated, bottom-up predictive-and-prescriptive analytics 
feedback loop of the sort outlined in §2.2, especially if one already has a particular 
history of searches and other types of engagement online. One may end up (despite 
attempting to avoid one kind of attractor) sucked in by a different attractor that 
enhances and confirms one’s pre-existing biases.  
 
If our arguments in this section are on the right track, inhabitants of the contemporary 
online news ecosystem face a daunting challenge. Unless they are content to be 
uninformed, they need to find a way to avoid getting sucked into the worldview 
                                               
43 Roberts and Wood (2007, Ch. 7).  
44 The ‘neutrality’ of algorithms as perceived by general Internet users, especially those by search engines, 
are debatable from an anthropological perspective. See Byrne & Cheong (2017). 
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promoted by curated news media while also avoiding getting sucked into a self-
confirmatory spiral of confirmation bias. For the Netizen whose dispositions and 
patterns of behavior online are not naturally virtuous and innocent to begin with (in 
other words, for almost everyone), managing to avoid the kinds of attractors noted in 
§§2.1-2.2 would take a great deal of luck.45  
4. Countering the seduction: technological and political solutions 
 
This paper began with the problem of online self-radicalization, a problem with at least 
three aspects: philosophical, political, and technological. In this concluding section, we 
survey potential solutions. 
 
4.1 Top-down solutions   
 
An initial obstacle to countering or mitigating the process whereby top-down seduction 
lures people to self-radicalisation is a discriminatory one. Recall that attractors as such 
are evaluatively neutral. Some tend towards beneficial consequences, some towards 
neutral or mixed consequences, and some towards harmful consequences. Any design 
principle that targeted attractors as such would be treating beneficial attractors that 
feature in the sort of choice architecture encouraged by nudge theorists as not relevantly 
different from the kinds of nefarious attractors surveyed in §2.1. Technological design 
that simply aims to eliminate attractors or reduce the scope of their basins is not a viable 
way to combat top-down seduction.  
 
An initial way forward is diagnostic and draws on the resources of cognitive ergonomics 
and cognitive systems engineering (CSE) (Hollnagel & Woods 1983; 2005). One 
straightforward description of the difference between positive nudging choice 
                                               
45 Here it is worth noting two interesting disanalogies between the way we encounter and interact with, on 
the one hand, mundane, non-technological choice architecture (of the sort Sunstein takes to be inevitable in 
the ordinary course of things) and, on the other, with the online news ecosystem, replete with the top-down 
and bottom-up feedback loops that we’ve shown to be characteristic of it. First, in the former case, choice 
architecture (noticed and unnoticed) can influence our decisions, so as to nudge us toward particular 
choices. Imagine, for instance, a small town with two schools, one Protestant, the other Catholic. This is a 
generic form of what we are calling top down seduction, as explained in §2.1. There is, however, no 
obvious analogue in the generic (non-technological) case to bottom up seduction; predictive and 
prescriptive analytics are distinctive of the technological case. This is important because, as we’ve 
suggested in this section, it is precisely the interplay between top-down and bottom-up seduction that 
generates a special kind of cyclical problem for online news users, one that does not have an obvious non-
technological analogue. A second disanalogy between the two cases concerns a comparative difference in 
friction. The online case is frictionless or at least has less friction. It also features push notifications, pop-up 
ads, and auto-play of recommended content (e.g., on YouTube), and in many cases personalization. These 
features remove friction almost entirely, by design, in a way that ordinary choice architecture does not do to 
the same extent. This second disanalogy, accordingly, is a disanalogy of degree. Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for encouraging expansion on this point. 
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architecture and the kind of top-down design we find in choice architecture such as 
Breitbart’s is this: Breitbart’s design aims to nudge readers in the directions it does 
regardless of any other relevant interests that should be taken into account. In this 
respect, nudging choice architecture is starkly different. Such architecture nudges the 
user to take into account what is in the user’s own interest in a way that is predicated 
upon the fact that individuals will often act against their own interests (Sunstein and 
Thaler 2003, p. 1159). 
 
CSE is useful here: in CSE, the user and the system are seen as a ‘single interacting 
system’ situated within a work context defined by the user’s aims, and within this work 
context CSE models how people perceive, process, attend to, and use information to 
achieve their goals (Ritter et al. 2014, 39). In the specific case where users are interacting 
with website architecture on news sites, the relevant work context is pretty clearly 
defined. The aim is conveying relevant news to the user in ways that are as friction-free 
as possible and meet journalistic thresholds of informativeness and accuracy. By 
modelling how actual use lines up with goals, researchers employing CSE have 
improved information technology design in multiple sectors, such as healthcare (Bisantz 
et al. 2014). For example, researchers take into account both the needs and the cognitive 
limits and pressures of diagnosticians, surgeons, emergency technicians, and so on in 
the design and implementation of visual displays, interactive communication systems, 
and other technologies. We expect that such models would be similarly fruitful in 
distinguishing which kinds of choice architecture lend themselves to use that runs 
contrary to users’ goals.  
 
In sum, CSE modeling offers a way of identifying one respect in which top-down design 
is problematic, and this is useful insofar as we want to clearly identify and eliminate the 
problem cases in a way that avoids, to the extent feasible, imposing our own values as 
designers on those who use a particular system. However, a pair of prescriptive 
problems remains: (i) what sort of ameliorative guidance is appropriate? (ii) How can 
compliance be ensured?  
 
First, regarding guidance: there is some hope from the Human-Computer Interaction 
(HCI) field (Card et al. 1980). HCI proponents recommend adhering to various concrete 
principles in the design process. For example, in the case of designing a news website, 
such principles include: “Have we made the most important information in this 
interface stand out [by means of font size, flow, etc.]?” “Will the user get the information 
they need in a timely fashion if there is an emergency?”46 Designers adhering to such 
principles will not structure the user’s experience of news acquisition so that it is 
constrained within the navigation space of Big Government, Big Journalism, Big Hollywood, 
National Security, Tech, and Sports.  
 
                                               
46 Ritter et al. (2014, p. 39). 
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Unfortunately, such guidance in the form of HCI principles will be useless against 
reckless and malicious designs that either disregard the prospect of technological 
seduction or actively aim to seduce users. The latter case are what Joanna Bryson calls 
‘evil programmers’.47 They employ technical design in an ideologically-motivated way 
with the aim of exploiting technology design to their own ends. After all, the 
imperatives that guide technical design are merely hypothetical in character: if designers 
have certain benevolent ends, then they ought to implement certain kinds of specific 
design strategies. It is of course doubtful that designers of the kinds of sites that exploit 
aggressive technological seduction have such ends.  
 
This bring us to the issue of compliance. In the face of ‘evil programmers’, viable 
solutions to top-down seduction move from the technological to the political. One form 
is imposed by International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a global body that 
regulates a wide range of products and services. While compliance with ISO is 
voluntary, the network-effect benefits of compliance make it advisable for all but the 
smallest firms. Consider in particular ISO standard 9241-210, which covers the 
ergonomics of human-computer interaction. According to the revised 9241-210, the 
following activities are requirements for human-centered design: 
 
1. Understanding and specifying the context of use, 
2. Specifying the user requirements in sufficient detail to drive the design, 
3. Producing design solutions that meet these requirements, and 
4. Conducting user-centered evaluations of these design solutions and modifying 
the design to take into account the results.48 
 
ISO 9241-210 can also be adopted in conjunction with ISO 9241-151, which covers 
“Guidance on World Wide Web user interfaces.” ISO 9241-151 specifically targets the 
design of websites, including best practices for “high-level design decisions and design 
strategy.”49 In our view, the “Black Crime” tag on Breitbart (§2.1) violates 9241-151.50 
However, it may be necessary to formulate and implement new ISO standards to cope 
with the problems caused by top-down technological seduction. For example, perhaps 
in addition to conducting user-centered evaluations only after a design has been 
implemented, it should be necessary to enlist a neutral third-party to survey (potential) 
users before a design is finalized and implemented. 
 
                                               
47 https://joanna-bryson.blogspot.co.uk/2017/07/three-very-different-sources-of-bias-in.html. Bryson’s 
thinking is especially important in the case of bottom-up design (see §4.2) 
48 https://www.iso.org/standard/52075.html. For discussion, see Rau (2013). 
49 https://www.iso.org/standard/37031.html. 
50 In a nutshell, the “Black Crime” example used in Breitbart’s navigation can be said to go against the 
specific aspect of “Appropriateness of content for the target group and tasks,” amongst others. A brief 
outline of the standard can be found in https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:37031:en. 
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However, enforcing compliance raises further political issues. In 2010, ISO 9241-210 
changed the above four activities to ‘requirements’ from mere ‘suggestions.’ Such 
language constitutes progress to the extent that local political bodies make compliance to 
such international standards mandatory — viz., where costs for non-compliance are 
significant.  
 
One note of optimism here concerns the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which safeguards EU citizens against privacy and data breaches. The updated 
regulations, which went into effect in May 2018 and protect only Europeans (unlike ISO, 
which is global), come with heavy penalties for breaches of GDPR regulations. For 
instance, serious infringements carry a maximum penalty of ‘up to 4% of annual global 
turnover or €20 Million (whichever is greater).’51 In the case of both Alphabet (Google’s 
parent company), and Facebook, this fine would sum to more than 1 billion euros. 
Although violations of ISO standard 9241-210 (and more generally, technological design 
decisions that have harmful consequences) are a different matter from data and privacy 
breaches of the sort targeted by GDPR, the precedent of imposing such penalties 
indicates that an updated GDPR may also ban and punish negligent and malicious 
technological designs that foster self-radicalization. Just this year (2018), Germany 
imposed a stringent new law against hate speech on social media, with associated fines 
up to €50M.52 
 
A final point: while our focus here has been technological design (and corresponding 
political interventions to such design), recent work on the social epistemology of the 
Internet53 suggests that a further mitigating solution may lie with user education in the 
form of online intellectual virtue inculcation. Such an approach has been pioneered in 
recent work by Richard Heersmink (2017), who defends a view according to which 
traditional epistemic virtues such as “curiosity, intellectual autonomy, intellectual 
humility, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual thoroughness, open-
mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual tenacity” (2017, 1) may be fruitfully 
deployed when interacting with search engines. For example, regarding intellectual 
carefulness, Heersmink writes that the careful user will, rather than accepting the first 
result, 
 
keep pursuing her enquiry until she has reached a proper level of understanding. 
This entails consulting and cross-checking at least a number of different online 
sources. It may also entail using different search terms such as, for instance, 
‘Why did the dinosaurs go extinct?’. Or include Boolean operators, for example: 
‘dinosaurs + extinct−creationism’ or ‘dinosaurs + extinct + scientific knowledge’.  
 
                                               
51 http://www.eugdpr.org/the-regulation.html  
52 See http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42510868. 
53 See, for example, Heersmink (2016), Miller and Record (2013; 2016), Simon (2015). 
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Such a careful user will be better off epistemically than one who manifests online 
carelessness. As Heersmink points out, the ‘featured snippet’ that Google shows if one 
simply types ‘What happened to the dinosaurs’ is the following paragraph of 
misinformation:  
 
The Bible gives us a framework for explaining dinosaurs in terms of thousands of 
years of history, including the mystery of when they lived and what happened to 
them. Dinosaurs are used more than almost anything else to indoctrinate 
children and adults in the idea of millions of years of earth history (2016, p. 66; 
see also Heersmink 2017).  
 
Heersmink’s call for virtue cultivation online is echoed by Shannon Vallor (2016, p. 10), 
who argues for the cultivation of “technomoral virtues explicitly designed to foster 
human capacities for flourishing with new technologies.” One way to accomplish this is 
by studying individuals who “speak up on important and controversial matters of 
global justice, security, and community civic engagement” (2016, p. 185) online, despite 
being attacked by trolls, as their “technomoral virtues of honesty, courage, civility, and 
perspective” (2016, p. 185) could lead to better design of social platforms.  
 
 
4.2 Bottom-up solutions  
 
Our recommendations for responding to bottom-up technological seduction mirror 
those for preventing and curbing top-down technological seduction. In the first instance, 
it’s helpful to distinguish between cases of negligence, where the relevant agents can be 
expected to amend their ways when they receive suitable guidance, and cases of 
recklessness and malicious intent, where regulation and enforcement are the only way to 
prevent and stop bad behaviour. 
 
To curb inadvertent bottom-up seduction, several solutions are promising. Since this 
phenomenon often involves the usurpation of people’s capacities to engage critically as 
both questioners and answerers of questions, technology could be designed in such a 
way that — instead of feeding people both questions and answers — it prompts people 
to reflect on the questions they are asking or the answers to them. This will be especially 
important in cases where someone is already one or more steps into a path-dependent 
inquiry. On the question side, search and recommender systems could be programmed 
to stop suggesting queries after a small, finite number of previous suggestions — at least 
until the user has gone through a ‘time out’ period. On the answer side, systems could 
be programmed to return a more diverse array of results after a small, finite number of 
previous answers. Both of these interventions should, in principle, help to reduce the 
gravitational power of attractors. It is of course not guaranteed that this sort of 
intervention would have stopped the radicalization of someone like Minassian. 
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However, interventions of this sort promise to choke the flow of Netizens down the 
four-step road from, “I know what you’re thinking” to extremism. 
 
Next, in addition to nudging the individual user to avoid problematic attractors, search 
and recommendation systems could be automatically monitored for the presence and 
advent of attractors as measured by, e.g., a very high ratio between in-degree and out-
degree. Since many attractors are evaluatively neutral or even beneficial, a specially-
trained team of computer scientists, social scientists, and humanists would then be 
tasked with investigating the basins of attraction identified in this way to determine 
whether any of them constitute hate-speech or are liable to lead to self-radicalization. 
Such content could then be de-indexed, pushed lower in people’s newsfeeds, and so on. 
 
Solutions along these lines are already being implemented. For instance, users who 
search for content related to the Islamic State on YouTube are being targeted with 
content that expresses skepticism about the aims and methods of the Islamic State 
(Holley 2017; Manjoo 2017). In the same vein, Facebook recently implemented a “related 
articles” widget that displays content from independent sources just below trending 
topics in users’ newsfeeds (Su 2017). 
 
While it may be possible to rely on well-intentioned and well-resourced firms to 
implement such design principles when given the chance, not all firms have sufficient 
good will and resources. For reckless and malicious actors, regulation with sufficient 
enforcement power will be needed. For well-intentioned firms that lack the 
technological skills or the resources to put those skills to use, a taxpayer-funded 
repository of code-reviewed open-source algorithms that embody best practices may be 
the optimal solution. 
 
Naturally, our recommendations in this section presuppose normative standards. These 
standards involve epistemic norms (e.g., conditions for harnessing the wisdom of 
crowds, which requires among other things decentralization and independence of 
sources), moral norms (e.g., related to the epistemic conditions for practical rationality), 
and political norms (e.g., related to the epistemic grounds for democracy). How best to 
manage the threat of technological seduction will always be a problem that requires both 
scientific expertise and humanistic reflection on the values we want our societies to 
embody. 
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